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Abstract. In this paper, I defend a strong version of actual inten-
tionalism. First, I argue against meaning subjectivism, conventional-
ism and contextualism. Second, I discuss what I take to be the most
important rival to actual intentionalism, namely hypothetical inten-
tionalism. I argue that, although hypothetical intentionalism might
be acceptable as a deﬁnition of the concept of utterance meaning, it
does not provide an acceptable answer to the question of what deter-
mines an utterance’s meaning. Third, I deal with the most serious ob-
jection against actual intentionalism, namely the failure objection. I
argue that the failure objection can be overcome within a framework
of full-blown actual intentionalism if one distinguishes between cat-
egorial and semantic intentions. Moreover, I show how this version
of actual intentionalism accounts for the possibility of innovative
metaphors and other implicatures. Finally, I demonstrate that ac-
tual intentionalism – thus construed – makes it possible to distin-
guish between communicative failures and the intentional breaking
of conventions.
1. Introduction
The central concern of this paper is an ontological question: Do works
of art have such a thing as an objective meaning with determinate bound-
aries, and if so, what is it that determines these boundaries? I wish to
defend a view known as actual intentionalism, the view that, ﬁrst, works of
art do have objective meaning, and, second, ultimately the meaning of a
work is determined by communicative intentions of the actual author. I
understand the concept of communicative intentions along the lines of
a Gricean analysis, which roughly states that the author intends to elicit
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particular mental states and/or episodes in virtue of her utterance. I focus
here on literary works of art, though much of what will be said is applicable
to other kinds of works as well.
I shall defend actual intentionalism by ruling out its main rivals, and
by providing a solution to what I take to be the most serious problem
for actual  intentionalism. The main rivals of actual intentionalism are
meaning subjectivism, conventionalism, contextualism, and hypothetical
intentionalism. I will start with meaning subjectivism, because meaning
subjectivism contradicts actual intentionalism as well as conventionalism,
contextualism, and hypothetical intentionalism. Thus, actual intentional-
ism as well as conventionalism, contextualism and hypothetical intention-
alism share common ground, namely meaning objectivism. The debate
between these positions just concerns the question of what constitutes a
work’s objective meaning, whereas meaning subjectivism denies that there is
such a thing as objective meaning.
In what follows, I distinguish literary works from texts. A text, as I use
the term here, is a sequence of words and/or sentences (more exactly a
type of such a sequence). Words and sentences have conventional meaning.
Conventional meaning, as I understand it, is the sort of meaning a reader
is able to grasp solely in virtue of having mastered the language in question,
i.e., in virtue of her lexicographical and grammatical knowledge.
A literary work contains a text as a constitutive part, but is usually not
exhausted by the text. It is plain that in most (if not in all) cases, a work’s
meaning is not exhausted by the conventional meaning of the utterances
it consists of. Metaphors, irony, and other implicatures transcend con-
ventional meaning, which typically does not exceed the level of sentences.
A work’s meaning, however, is generated (in most, if not in all cases) to a
considerable extent beyond the sentence level. Lexicographical and gram-
matical knowledge therefore is inadequate for fully understanding those
levels of meaning that are generated through the interrelations of the sen-
tences within a text.
2. Meaning Subjectivism
According to what I call meaning subjectivism, a work does not have ob-
jective meaning, i.e. any meaning that is independent from an interpret-
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ing subject. Rather, a work gains its meaning only through the interpre-
tive processes of particular readers at particular occasions. Here, “inter-
pretive processes” are to be understood in a very wide sense, which not
only includes conscious and explicit interpretive eﬀorts, but all cognitive
processes that could be subsumed under the label of “understanding” or
“making sense of” the work in question.1
Consequently, according to meaning subjectivism, the uninterpreted
work is a meaningless something. Under appropriate circumstances (i.e.
when a reader tries to make sense of it), however, it  may elicit mean-
ings. Diﬀerent readers (or even the same reader on diﬀerent occasions) are
likely to arrive at distinct meanings. One and the same work may therefore
elicit a countless number of distinct meanings, none of which, however,
can claim a particular status as the proper meaning of the work. Accordingly,
statements about a work’s meaning are not true or false in any usual sense.
A true or objectively right interpretation does not exist.
Meaning subjectivism, thus construed, is not, in itself, an inconsistent
view. It is, however, in conﬂict with well-entrenched conceptions and
practices. It stands at odds with standard conceptions of works, texts,
meanings, and authors, as well as with the actual practice of interpreta-
tion, literary criticism, translation, and copyright law.
Here is what I take to be the standard conceptions:
1. Works and texts are not just sequences of meaningless patterns, but
also (and perhaps primarily) sequences of ideas and thoughts, which
are the meanings of the patterns in question. Thus, meanings are not
simply attached to works and texts under appropriate circumstances.
Meanings are rather constitutive parts of works and texts.
2. Works and texts are created. The creators of works and texts are the
authors.
3. The creation of works and texts essentially involves intentional ac-
tivities. Consider, for  instance, an author who creates a text by
putting words on screen: Putting words on screen in the relevant
sense is more than playing a mere causal role in a process at the end
1 See, e.g., Fish 1980, Shusterman 1992.
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of which something that looks like words and sentences appears on
a screen. Putting words on screen involves the intention to put words
on screen. Something (for example, a computer program or a hail-
storm) may cause something that looks exactly like words on a screen,
without having put words on the screen. This is because computer
programs and hailstorms do not have the required intentions.
The intention to produce words and sentences consists in the intention
to produce (tokens of) patterns that have a conventional meaning within
a language. The intention to utter particular words and sentences consists
in the intention to produce (tokens of) patterns that have a particular con-
ventional meaning within a language.
Meaning subjectivism is inconsistent with either of these conceptions
of works, texts, and authorship. It is also inconsistent with widespread
practices of interpretation, literary criticism, translation, and copyright
law.
Meaning subjectivism is thus a highly revisionary view. Of course, the
standard conceptions might be on the wrong track, but the burden of ar-
gument is on the side of the revisionist. Why should we jettison well-
entrenched conceptions of the central concepts of literary theory, when
these conceptions are not only conceptually consistent, but also consis-
tent with deeply rooted and almost universal practices of our intercourse
with literature?
In what follows, I discuss what I take to be the most important argu-
ments in favor of meaning subjectivism.2
1. Proponents of meaning subjectivism sometimes claim that it is simply
not true that the search for objective meaning is a standard practice in the
interpretation of literary texts. Rather, it is argued, when readers interpret
literature, they are interested in what a text could mean or perhaps what it
means to them.
Reply: This is an empirical hypothesis that can be falsiﬁed by investi-
gating the actual practices of literary criticism. To put it very carefully: I
grant that the search for subjective and possible meanings is sometimes the
2 For the following, see my “Objective Interpretation and the Metaphysics of Mean-
ing” (Reicher 2010).
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aim of interpretation in literature; but the search for objective meaning is
at least as widespread.
2. Proponents of meaning subjectivism argue that meaning objectivism
ignores the fact that reading can be a creative process in its own right.
Reply: Reading can indeed be a creative process, but that does not
imply that objective meaning does not exist. One may grant a creative
role to the reader without abolishing the author.
In many cases, the reader’s creativity, her subjective meaning attribu-
tions, serve the overall goal of discovering what the text really means. In
other cases, the reader is creative in the sense that she uses her imagina-
tion to ﬁll in the gaps left by the author.
3. Meaning subjectivists argue that meaning objectivism cannot account
for the fact that there is often (if not always) more than one correct inter-
pretation of a work.
Reply: Of course, there may be more than one correct interpretation
of a work. Various correct interpretations of the same work may bring to
light distinct parts or aspects of the work’s meaning. Meaning objectivism
does not rule out this possibility. Meaning objectivism only contends that
there may be correct as well as incorrect interpretations.
4. One of the most popular objections to meaning objectivism is that it
ignores the fact that it is often diﬃcult (if not impossible) to know for
certain what the objective meaning of a given text is.
Reply: While it may be diﬃcult to explore the nature of a certain piece
of reality, this, of course, does not entail the non-existence of this piece of
reality. Meaning objectivism does not imply that infallible knowledge can
be obtained about objective meanings.
To sum up: There are no cogent arguments against meaning objectivism.
Therefore, there is no reason to give up the standard conceptions of works,
texts, and authorship and to reject standard practices as nonsensical in
favor of meaning subjectivism.
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3. Conventionalism and Contextualism
Conventionalism is the view that the respective meaning of a work or text
depends solely on linguistic conventions. In other words, according to
conventionalism, a work’s meaning is identical to the conventional mean-
ings of the words and word-sequences that constitute the work. According
to conventionalism, interpretative questions have to be settled by taking
recourse to lexicography and grammar only.
Conventionalism, at least in its pure form, is an untenable view for at
least two reasons. First, it leaves open how it is determined what conven-
tions are in play and, moreover, whether any conventions are in play in the
ﬁrst place. Consider, for instance, one of Monroe Beardsley’s famous ex-
amples: the verse “He raised his plastic arm.” According to one linguistic
convention, “plastic” is synonymous with “made of a synthetic material”,
according to another it is synonymous with “shapely”. Conventionalism
alone does not answer the question of whether the ﬁrst or the second of
these two conventions is at play on a given occasion or indeed neither.
Moreover, intuitively, it seems possible that there are tokens of pat-
terns that look like tokens of the sentence “He raised his plastic arm” and
yet have no conventional meaning at all. A pattern of this sort might be
realized, for instance, by sheer coincidence, on the sandy ground of the
deep sea or on some uninhabited planet that will never be discovered by
any conscious being. It is at least debatable whether the given patterns in
such cases have any conventional meaning at all. If they do not, the ques-
tion arises as to the circumstances under which tokens of patterns would
have conventional meaning. Conventionalism by itself does not provide
an answer to this question.
Second, as stated above, the meaning of a literary work usually com-
prises much more than the conventional meaning of its text. Convention-
alism can hardly do justice to metaphorical meaning, irony and other impli-
catures (including those that serve to disambiguate utterances like “My car
ran out of gas”). To claim that these elements do not belong to a work’s
meaning would deprive literary works of some of their most distinctive
features – those features, namely, which are critical for our appreciation
of the works.
Consider, for instance, the debate about the meaning of the last line of
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Goethe’s famous poem “Wanderer’s Nightsong”: “Just wait, soon you will
rest, too.” Linguistic conventions do not determine to whom the “you” in
this line refers. (Is it the author or a ﬁctitious speaker? Is it some other
particular addressee or simply any listener?) They do not explain whether
this line is to be understood as a promise or consolation or, conversely,
a threatening prediction. Finally, and above all, they do not determine
whether the “rest” is to be understood as the tired wanderer’s nightly sleep,
death or both.
According to contextualism, the meaning of an utterance is determined
by the context of the utterance. Usually, contextualism and conventional-
ism go hand in hand. One might argue that it is the context of the utterance
– instead of the author’s intentions – that determines, ﬁrst, whether a par-
ticular pattern has conventional meaning in the ﬁrst place, and, second,
which linguistic conventions are at play. Furthermore, it could be argued
that those aspects of meaning that are not determined by linguistic con-
ventions are determined by the context. In other words, according to con-
textualism, the context ﬁlls in the gaps left by conventionalism.3
In my view, however, this account puts the cart before the horse. In
fact, the context of utterance plays an epistemological role, since it gives
us clues to the author’s intentions. Thus, it often helps us to discover the
meaning of an utterance – but it does not determine the utterance’s mean-
ing.
To illustrate this point, it may help to imagine the lettering “PERA”
on a display window. “Pera” is the Italian word for “pear”, but it is also the
name of a district in the town of Istanbul, the transliteration of an ancient
Greek word meaning “wallet” or “leathern sack, in which travellers and
shepherds carried their provisions”, the name of a village in Cyprus and
the name of a botanic species. We now might suppose that the window
in question is the window of a restaurant in a German town, the dishes
on the restaurant’s menu are mainly Turkish, and the restaurant’s walls
are decorated with photographs from a large city located at the shore of
a large body of water. These contextual facts might be taken as evidence
for the hypothesis that the letters on the window denote the district in Is-
3 For conventionalist arguments see Nathan 1992 (though Nathan in the ﬁnal resort
opts for hypothetical intentionalism).
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tanbul, not the fruit, the leather sack, the Cypriote village or the botanic
species. Thus, one might say that the context helps to disambiguate the
writing. But it does so because it provides us with evidence of the restau-
rant owner’s intentions.
4. Hypothetical Intentionalism
Hypothetical intentionalists distinguish between utterer’s meaning and ut-
terance meaning, identifying a work’s meaning with the latter. William Tol-
hurst, one of the leading advocates of hypothetical intentionalism, expli-
cates utterance meaning as follows:
[U]tterance meaning is best understood as the intention which a
member of the intended audience would be most justiﬁed in attribut-
ing to the author based on the knowledge and attitudes which he
possesses in virtue of being a member of the intended audience.
Thus utterance meaning is to be construed as that hypothesis of ut-
terer’s meaning which is most justiﬁed on the basis of those beliefs
and attitudes which one possesses qua intended hearer or intended
reader. (Tolhurst 1979, 11)
Diﬀerent  versions  of  hypothetical  intentionalism are  distinguished by
their understanding of the relevant audience. In Tolhurst’s version, the rel-
evant audience is determined by the actual author’s intentions. Tolhurst’s
hypothetical intentionalism thus still incorporates a signiﬁcant element of
actual intentionalism. For Tolhurst, the meaning of an utterance is just the
meaning that a member of the intended audience would be most justiﬁed
to believe to be the meaning intended by the author.
In contrast to Tolhurst, Jerrold Levinson, another prominent advocate
of hypothetical intentionalism, does not leave it to the author to deter-
mine the relevant audience. Rather, he construes the relevant audience –
independently of the author’s intentions – as an ideal audience. Utterance
meaning is thus deﬁned as the meaning that a member of the ideal audi-
ence would be most justiﬁed believing to be the author’s actually intended
meaning.
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It should be noted that the explications of the notion of the relevant
audience given so far do not determine which beliefs and attitudes a mem-
ber of this audience is supposed to have. Both the conception of the
relevant audience as the actually intended audience and that of the relevant
audience as an ideal audience are compatible with a wide range of require-
ments. In principle, the constraints on the relevant audience in both ver-
sions might range from merely having mastered English and having basic
knowledge about the world to having a thorough acquaintance with other
works of the author and the author’s contemporaries, or familiarity with
philosophical, sociological, and political currents that might have inﬂu-
enced the author, or a theoretical background and scientiﬁc knowledge
of all sorts, and, indeed, even knowledge that the actual author could not
possess.
Advocates of hypothetical intentionalism tend to be vague about what
constraints are in place. The required background knowledge falls some-
where between a mere mastering of the work’s language and virtual om-
niscience. It is clear, however, that the resources of the intended and/or
ideal audience must be publicly accessible. That is, whatever beliefs and
attitudes may be required by a member of the relevant audience, it can-
not be required that she has direct acquaintance with the author’s actual
intentions.
It seems reasonable to assume that hypothetical intentionalism coin-
cides with actual intentionalism in many – if not in most – cases. For if the
author has done a reasonably good job and if a member of the intended au-
dience develops an interpretive hypothesis on the basis of all the relevant
resources that are available to her, the hypothesis should be true.
However, hypothetical and actual intentionalism fall apart when the
author does not succeed in communicating her actual intentions to the
relevant audience. According to actual intentionalism, the work in these
unfortunate cases means what the author intended it to mean (no mat-
ter of how the audience understands it), whereas, according to hypotheti-
cal intentionalism, the work in fact means what the intended and/or ideal
readers believe it to mean (no matter what the author intended).
At ﬁrst glance, hypothetical intentionalism is intuitively attractive be-
cause it combines two features: On the one hand, it seems to retain a close
connection to the author’s actual intentions (which ﬁts well with our stan-
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dard conception of works, texts, and authorship, and with standard prac-
tices of interpretation and literary criticism). On the other hand, in those
cases where communication between author and audience fails because of
a mistake by the author, hypothetical intentionalism seems to yield intu-
itively correct results, whereas actual intentionalism seems to yield intu-
itively incorrect results.
It seems absurd to claim that a text means whatever its author intended
it to mean – no matter what she may have actually put to screen. Sup-
pose an author intends to write a text in standard English and formulates
the following sentence: “In the backyard, a pear tree was blooming.” Her
communicative intention, however, was to express that a plum tree was
blooming in the backyard. Suppose, furthermore, that the author does
not indicate anywhere in the text that she actually meant “plum tree” in-
stead of “pear tree”. In this case, actual intentionalism seems to be bound
to argue – quite dubiously – that “pear tree” means “plum tree”. By con-
trast, according to hypothetical intentionalism,“pear tree” in this instance
means “pear tree”. Thus, what the author actually said is that there was
a blooming pear tree in the backyard – even though she intended to say
something else. Intuitively, the hypothetical intentionalist interpretation
of this case looks correct.
Nevertheless, I want to argue in the remainder of this paper that ac-
tual intentionalism is superior to hypothetical intentionalism. First, I will
raise an objection to hypothetical intentionalism. I will then defend actual
intentionalism against what I take to be the most serious objection to it,
namely that it is unable to plausibly explain those cases where a text does
not mean what the author intended it to mean.
Reconstruction and Critique of Hypothetical Intentionalism
In what follows I will argue that hypothetical intentionalism does not pro-
vide a feasible answer to the question of what determines utterance mean-
ing. I will show this by reconstructing hypothetical intentionalism on the
basis of its formulation by William Tolhurst. I propose, to begin with, the
following reconstruction of hypothetical intentionalism:
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(HI) An utterance u means m if, and only if: If there is a reader r who is a
member of the relevant audience, then r is justiﬁed in believing that
the author of u intended u to mean m.
Two explanatory remarks: First, for the sake of brevity, I will speak of “the
relevant audience” instead of “the intended and/or ideal audience”. I wish
to leave it open here whether the relevant audience is determined by actual
authorial intentions or by some standards that are independent from the
author. Second, I understand the locution “is justiﬁed to believe p” in the
sense of “is more justiﬁed to believe p than to believe non-p”.
(HI) looks plausible from the outset. Although a lot surely hinges on
how the relevant audience is construed exactly, I do not wish to question
the truth of (HI) here. At least for the sake of argument, I grant that, if an
utterance u means m, then, if there is a reader with the appropriate beliefs
and attitudes, she is justiﬁed in believing that the author of u intended u
to mean m. I also grant that, if a reader with the appropriate beliefs and
attitudes is justiﬁed in believing that the author of u intended u to mean
m, then u indeed means m.
(HI) may therefore go through as a materially adequate explication of
the concept of utterance meaning (that is, it picks out the right extension).
Whether (HI) is also an illuminating explication, is a diﬀerent question
which I do not wish to enter here. It should be remembered, however,
that the point of departure for this paper was not how the concept of
utterance meaning is to be deﬁned, but the question of what determines an
utterance’s meaning (assuming that there is such a thing as a determinate
meaning of an utterance). Hypothetical intentionalism does not provide
a convincing answer to this question, however.
Determination, as I understand it, is a metaphysical grounding relation.
To say that the meaning of an utterance is determined by actual autho-
rial intentions is to say that an utterance u means m because the author
actually intended such-and-such. An utterance has its meaning in virtue of
the author’s actual intentions. In other words, according to actual inten-
tionalism, the author’s actual intentions are the metaphysical ground of an
utterance’s meaning.
According to hypothetical intentionalism, however, the metaphysical
ground of an utterance’s meaning is supposed to be hypothetical inten-
44
Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics, vol. 5, 2013
Maria E. Reicher Actualist Meaning Objectivism
tions. In other words, according to hypothetical intentionalism, an utter-
ance u means m, because of the conditional fact that, if there is a reader r
who is a member of the relevant audience, then r is justiﬁed in believing
that the author of u intended u to mean m.
Yet it seems plain that this conditional fact cannot be the metaphys-
ical ground of the (unconditional) fact that an utterance u means m. It is
not the case that u means m because a reader with particular beliefs and
attitudes (if there is such a person) is justiﬁed in believing that the author
of u intended u to mean m. Rather, it seems to be the other way around:
Because u means m, a reader with appropriate beliefs and attitudes would
be justiﬁed in believing that the author of u intended u to mean m.
Consider the following analogy: It is not the case that a chemical sub-
stance s has the composition XYZ because an ideal scientist would be jus-
tiﬁed in believing that s has the composition XYZ. It is, in fact, the other
way around: Because s has the composition XYZ, an ideal scientist would
be justiﬁed in believing that s has the composition XYZ.
To sum up: Even if one grants that hypothetical intentionalism pro-
vides a materially adequate deﬁnition of the concept of utterance meaning,
it does not provide a plausible answer to the question of what determines
an utterance’s meaning.
5. A Plea for Actual Intentionalism
In contrast to meaning subjectivism, actual intentionalism ﬁts very well
with the standard conceptions of works, texts, meanings, and authors, as
well as with the actual practice of interpretation, literary criticism, trans-
lation, and copyright law. In contrast to conventionalism, it does justice to
metaphorical meaning, irony and other implicatures. In contrast to con-
textualism, it does justice to the diﬀerence between matters of ontology
and matters of epistemology. In contrast to hypothetical intentionalism,
it provides a plausible answer to the question of what determines an utter-
ance’s meaning.
So why is actual intentionalism not universally accepted? There are
a number of reasons, some of which – as has been shown at length else-
where – are based on misunderstandings that can be overcome quite eas-
ily. Rather than simply rehearsing the discussion of these “easy objections”
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here, I will focus on what I take to be the most serious objection against
actual intentionalism: the “failure objection”.
The Failure Objection
The most serious objection against actual intentionalism is that actual in-
tentionalism does not have an adequate explanation for communicative
failures. More precisely, actual intentionalism seems to blur the distinc-
tion between what an author intended to say and what she actually said (i.e.
what her utterance actually means).4 I call this the failure objection. While
the pear and plum tree case mentioned above is a useful illustration, it
is possible to think of a more extreme example. Imagine a person who,
in a state of extreme delusion, intends to write a sequence of grammat-
ical English sentences with a particular meaning, but in fact only writes
down a sequence of arbitrary letters and punctuation marks (and realizes
her failure only the day after, when the eﬀect of the drug has worn oﬀ or
the psychotic attack has subsided). Proponents of actual intentionalism
seem to be bound to say that the sequence of arbitrary letters and punctu-
ations marks is a (meaningful) text, because the temporally deluded person
intended to communicate something with it. This seems to be just wrong.
As I see it, the failure objection is the most serious challenge to actual
intentionalism. As I have already indicated, in many (if not most) cases,
what an author intended to say and what she actually said will coincide due
to her proﬁciency and eﬀort. Nevertheless, the author may not succeed,
i.e., she may not able to say what she intended to say. If actual intention-
alism cannot account for this fact, it should be abandoned.
A solution seems to present itself in which this problem is overcome
through some sort of watering down of actual intentionalism. One might
say, for instance, that the author’s power to confer a particular meaning m
to a pattern by intending the pattern to mean m is restricted by linguistic
conventions. According to this proposal, the author’s intentions become
eﬀective only if they are compatible with the linguistic conventions that
are in force.5 At ﬁrst glance, this move looks appealing. It also seems to
4 See Levinson 1992, 236; Dickie & Wilson 1995.
5 For versions of moderate actual intentionalism see, for instance, Carroll 2000 and
Stecker 2006.
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provide a solution to the above objection: Since they are bound by lin-
guistic conventions, authors do not have unrestricted power to give any
meaning m to a given pattern just by intending to express m by means of
this pattern. Therefore, it may happen that an author does not say what
she intended to say.
However, such watered-down versions of actual intentionalism gener-
ate problems of their own: The view that an author’s power to confer
meaning is restricted by conventions entails that metaphorical speech is
hardly possible, since fresh and inventive metaphors owe their existence
precisely to a breaking up of existing conventions.6
Moreover, and more radically, there is what I call the “Bichsel problem”,
named after the Swiss author Peter Bichsel. Bichsel is the author of a story
entitled “A Table Is a Table”, in which a man decides to re-name the things
in his environment:
He called the bed picture.
He called the table carpet.
He called the chair alarm clock.
He called the newspaper bed.
He called the mirror chair.
He called the alarm clock photograph album.
He called the wardrobe newspaper.
He called the carpet wardrobe.
He called the picture table.
And he called the photograph album mirror.
So:
In the morning the old man would lie in picture for a long time, at
nine the photograph album rang, the man got up and stood on the
wardrobe, so his feet wouldn’t feel cold, then he took his clothes out
of the newspaper, dressed, looked into the chair on the wall, then sat
down on the alarm clock at the carpet and turned the pages of the
mirror until he found his mother’s table. (Bichsel 1971, 18)
Just what is Bichsel saying when he produces the utterance “the old man
would lie in picture for a long time, at nine the photograph album rang ...”?
6 Nathan argues that one could construe the conventions more genereously, such that
they leave room for ironic and metaphorical speech. However, this entails the danger of
over-stretching the notion of conventions. (See Nathan 1992.)
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It seems clear that Bichsel is saying that the old man would lie in bed for
a long time and that his alarm clock rang, and so on. But according to the
conventions of English, “picture” means picture and not bed, and “photo-
graph album” means photograph album and not alarm clock, and so on.
Thus, a proponent of the watered-down version of actual intentionalism
would appear obliged to maintain that Bichsel is saying that the old man’s
photograph album rang.
To sum up the problem: It seems that actual intentionalism is not
able to account for the fact that there might be a diﬀerence between
what an author intended to say and what she actually said when the au-
thor unintentionally violates linguistic conventions. The obvious solution
to this problem seems to be to postulate that the author’s power to con-
fer meaning to her utterances by means of her intentions is restricted by
linguistic intentions. However, this watered-down actual intentionalism
faces the problem that it cannot account for the fact that authors are able
to break with linguistic intentions intentionally, for instance by creating
fresh metaphors, or, more radically, by creating a whole secret language,
as in Bichsel’s case.
A Solution to the Failure Objection
The solution I am going to propose rests on a distinction of two sorts of
intentions, both of which are involved in the overall communicative in-
tention to bring about a particular mental state or episode in virtue of a
particular utterance. I call these two sorts of intentions compliance inten-
tions and semantic intentions, respectively.
On the most basic level, authors (usually) intend in the ﬁrst place that
the pattern token they produce be a text, i.e. a sequence of words and sen-
tences. This entails the intention that the pattern token will comply (to
a certain extent at least) with orthographical, grammatical, and semantic
rules. Such rules, however, are always bound to a particular language. Ac-
cordingly, authors (usually) intend to make use of a particular language L.
Therefore, authors usually intend (to a certain extent at least) to follow the
rules of L, including the semantic rules. This is the compliance intention.
A semantic intention, by contrast, is the intention to bring about a par-
ticular mental episode (say, an image of a blooming plum tree in a back-
yard) by means of an utterance.
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I propose the following version of actual intentionalism:
(AI) An utterance u means m if, and only if: The author of u intended u to
mean m (semantic intention) and u complies with the semantic rules
the author intended to follow (compliance intention).
The solution to the failure problem now runs as follows: If the author ut-
ters “There was a pear tree” and means that there was a plum tree, her
utterance does not mean that there was a plum tree, because the utter-
ance does no comply with the semantic rules the author intended to fol-
low (given that the author intended to follow the rules of standard En-
glish). Similarly, in the delusion case, the sequence of arbitrary letters and
punctuation marks does not mean what the author intended it to mean,
because the author intended to comply with the rules of standard English
and she failed to do so.
However, in contrast to the watered-down actual intentionalism dis-
cussed above, this solution does justice to the fact that authors can de-
liberately break up the semantic rules of a given language. In the case
of fresh metaphors, as well as in the case of the man in Bichsel’s story,
authors/speakers deliberately abandon existing semantic conventions and
substitute them with their own semantic rules.
Thus, the account that I propose here allows for a distinction between
mistakes and failures, on the one hand, and conscious breaks with existing
conventions, on the other. Accordingly, if the author consciously decides
to alter the semantic rules of English such that “pear” means “plum”, then
the sentence “A pear tree was blooming” actually means “A plum tree was
blooming” (though to understand the sentence correctly, it is necessary to
realize that it is no longer an English sentence). Similarly, an apparently
arbitrary sequence of letters and punctuation marks may indeed be a text
if the author has made use of a secret code – even if the author herself
is the only person who knows that code. These results look intuitively
plausible to me.
Authors are free to break up conventions at any level. In extreme
forms of sound poetry and shape poetry, they consciously refuse to produce
sequences of words and sentences. This has been the most radical break
with linguistic and literary conventions. In less extreme cases, authors
49
Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics, vol. 5, 2013
Maria E. Reicher Actualist Meaning Objectivism
consciously  break  orthographical  and/or  grammatical  and/or  semantic
conventions, while sticking to the overall intention to produce a text. Au-
thors may also consciously break with certain genre conventions while
sticking to the overall intention to produce a work that belongs to a par-
ticular genre.
Authors may accept existing conventions without any revisions, partly
follow and slightly modify them, or reject them completely. This is what
makes fresh metaphors and other inventive implicatures possible. An au-
thor’s power to confer a particular meaning to a particular pattern is not
restricted by any conventions – apart from those that the author herself
intends to follow.
A Possible Objection
At the outset, I claimed that it is the purpose of this paper to defend actual
intentionalism. But is the view I have proposed really intentionalism in the
ﬁrst place? Is it not rather a form of conventionalism?
My answer to this is the following: Obviously, there is an element of
conventionalism involved. Thus, if conventionalism is just the view that
conventions play a role in determining the meanings of utterances, one
might indeed classify my view as a form of conventionalism. On the other
hand, I have characterized actual intentionalism as the view that the mean-
ing of an utterance is ultimately determined by the communicative inten-
tions of the actual author. As I see it, my view is still in accordance with
this characterization, since I believe that communicative intentions in-
volve not only semantic intentions but also compliance intentions. At any
rate, the author’s actual intentions still wear the trousers.7
7 This is a substantially revised version of the paper I presented at the ESA confer-
ence in Prague in June 2013. A still older version has been discussed at the Philoso-
phy Department at the RWTH Aachen University. I am indebted to numerous people
for helpful comments, especially to Daniel Dohrn, Ludger Jansen, Nicola Mößner, and
Thomas Petraschka (see Petraschka 2013), but also to several members of the audience
of my presentation in Prague.
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